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it is crucial for the parties to a bankruptcy case to understand the jurisprudence of the preemption
doctrine before proceeding.
Preemption is a judicially created doctrine pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article
VI of the United States Constitution4 that “invalidates state law that interfere with, or are
contrary to, federal law.”5 In turn, the application of preemption in bankruptcy is highly nuanced
because bankruptcy courts must often look to state law to determine the rights and obligations of
the parties to a bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, bankruptcy is a unique area of the federal law
because of the high level of interaction between state law and the Code.
This article discusses the application of the preemption doctrine in bankruptcy, and more
specifically, to section 502 of the Code which governs the claims allowance process. Part I
examines the doctrine of preemption, and its various applications in bankruptcy. Part II provides
background information for the In re Princeton case. Finally, Part III discusses the Third
Circuit’s opinion in In re Princeton, and the implications of that decision to the application of the
preemption doctrine in bankruptcy.
I.

The Doctrine of Preemption

The Constitution declares itself to be the “supreme law of the land.”6 The Constitution
extends this principle to “laws made pursuant to the Constitution” as well.7 See Id. The
Supremacy Clause is the fundamental guiding principle of our Country’s system of dual
sovereignty between the Federal government and the governments of the several states. While
the structure of the Constitution evinces an intent for the Federal and state governments to
operate in separate spheres, there has been substantial overlap between the two in practice. To
4

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Hillsborough Cty., Florida. v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (other quotations
omitted).
6
U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
7
See Id.
5

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

address this conflict, the Federal Judiciary created the doctrine of preemption. The essential rule
of preemption is such that, “state laws that interfere with or are contrary to federal law are
without effect pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.”8
In the bankruptcy context, the application of preemption has highly varied because of the
high level of interaction of state law to bankruptcy. In most cases, the rights and obligations of
the parties to a bankruptcy proceeding are originally created under state law. Such as the parties’
property and contract rights. Consequently, certain provisions of the Code explicitly carve out
room for the operation of state law because of this high level of interaction.9 On the other hand,
courts have also found that certain provisions of the code explicitly require the preemption of
state law.10 See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (property of the debtor “becomes property of the estate
notwithstanding ... any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable” state law).
However, outside of clear circumstances such as the examples provided above, the outcome is
less certain. Therefore, the application of preemption in bankruptcy is far from settled doctrine.
A. Preemption in General

The Supreme Court has stated numerous times that “[a] fundamental principle of the
Constitution is that Congress has the power to preempt state law.”11 When Congressional
legislation, or the Constitution preempts state law, “the state law must yield.”12 In turn, the
Supreme Court has identified and categorized the following three varieties of preemption:
(1) express preemption; (2) field preemption; and (3) conflict preemption.13 Norton’s Journal of

8

Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. 713.
See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (proving that subordination agreements executed under state law are “enforceable in
bankruptcy to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under” state law).
10
See 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1) (2012) (property of the debtor “becomes property of the estate notwithstanding ... any
provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable” state law).
11
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (other citations omitted).
12
Id.
13
See Id. (explaining, “even without an express provision for preemption, we have found state law to be preempted
by Congressional legislation in at least two circumstances”).
9
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Bankruptcy Practice provides a summary of the circumstances wherein each category of
preemption will apply. Explaining,
“[e]xpress preemption applies ‘when there is an explicit statutory command that
state law be displaced.’ Field preemption applies when federal law ‘is sufficiently
comprehensive to warrant an inference that Congress “left no room” for state
regulation.’ Conflict preemption applies if a state law conflicts with a federal law
such that: ‘(1) it is impossible to comply with both state law and federal law; or
(2) the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”14
Thus, preemption is a context sensitive doctrine. Accordingly, the analysis will depend
on the particular area of law at issue, and other relevant circumstances, but the lynchpin of
preemption is Congressional intent. In some instances, Congress has made their intent clear by
including explicit language requiring a conflicting state law to be preempted. For example, the
Supreme Court in National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452 (2012), held that a California law
making it a crime for slaughterhouses to commit certain actions, or otherwise dispose of nonambulatory animals was explicitly preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FIMA”).15
However, even where a federal statute does not contain such an explicit directive, courts
have nevertheless inferred a Congressional intent to preempt state law from other reasons. For
example, only a few months after the Supreme Court decided Harris, the Court struck down an
Arizona law criminalizing certain employment related activities by illegal aliens.16 Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion reasoned that because Congress’s constitutional authority to make
uniform rules of naturalization was of an exclusive nature, the Arizona law was preempted.17

14

Jeffrey B. Ellman, Brett J. Berlin, BANKRUPTCY CODE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW, 21 Nort. J. Bankr. L. & Prac.
3 Art. 2 (2012) (other citations omitted).
15
See Harris, 565 U.S. 457 (2012) (noting, “FIMA contains an express preemption provision ... [which] reads,
‘[r]equirements within the scope of this [Act] ... which are in addition to, or different than those made under this
[Act] may not be imposed by any [s]tate’”) (other citations omitted).
16
See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012) (explaining, Arizona’s expansion of state law
enforcement’s authority to “perform the functions of an immigration officer” contravened federal law because
federal law “specified” that this may only be done in “limited circumstances”).
17
See Id.
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B. Preemption in Bankruptcy

Similar to the Naturalization Clause, the Constitution grants Congress the sole authority
“to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.”18
Furthermore, the Constitution reinforces the exclusiveness of Congress’s authority in this area
through Article I section 10’s prohibition on the ability of states to diminish the requirements of
contracts.19 This exclusive grant of authority recognizes, that to have an effective system of
bankruptcy, states’ systems of contract and property law must be overridden to the detriment of
some, but for the benefit of the group.20 Therefore, the overall policy of bankruptcy is to benefit
as many parties to the proceeding as much as possible.21
Pursuant to its authority, Congress has enacted several bankruptcy statutes throughout
history. Currently, bankruptcy cases are governed by title 11 of the United States Code.
Because bankruptcy affects nearly every aspect of a debtor’s existence, it is no surprise that the
Code overlaps with state law in numerous circumstances. Thus, like other areas of federal law,
the Code will preempt state law where the two are irreconcilable. However, because the Code
does not contain a “global explicit statutory command” to preempt state law in every instance,
courts apply the preemption analysis on a case-by-case basis with respect to the specific Code
provision at issue.22 Therefore, when considering the application of preemption in bankruptcy,

18

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
See U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1, (providing, “[n]o state shall ... pass any ... [l]aw impairing the [o]bligation of
[c]ontracts”).
20
See Ellman et al., BANKRUPTCY CODE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW, Nort. J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 Art. 2
(explaining, “the restrictions otherwise applicable to the debtor under state law will become subordinate to the
Bankruptcy Code to the extent necessary to enable the debtor to act on its bankruptcy rights, which may also mean
limiting the rights creditors otherwise would have under state law”).
21
See Howard Delivery Service, Inc. v. Zurich Americans Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 656 (2006) (stating, “we are
mindful that the Bankruptcy Code aims, in the main, to secure equal distribution among creditors”).
22
See Ellman et al., BANKRUPTCY CODE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW, Nort. J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 Art. 2.
19
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courts primarily analyze the legislative intent of the Code, as well as its policies, and the
language contained within specific provisions at issue.23
1. Express Preemption

Courts have found express preemption to apply from certain sections of the Code
containing “notwithstanding” language.24 Therefore, as the name suggests, this category of
preemption is found from “express” language within the Code.
2. Field Preemption

Courts have explained the doctrine of field preemption using two different formulations.
First, “where Congress has laid down a scheme of federal regulation sufficiently comprehensive
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for supplementary state
regulation.”25 Second, when the court finds the field is such that, “the federal interest is so
dominant, the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same
subject.”26 The first form of field preemption mentioned above is the most commonly found
form of preemption in bankruptcy cases.27 Thus, the general rule under the first form of field
preemption is such that state law must give way to the Code when the state law would impede on
“core bankruptcy functions.”28
Interestingly, even where courts agree that field preemption is applicable in a given
bankruptcy case, there can be a notable difference in the scope of its application. In fact, there
have been disagreements as to the scope of its application in bankruptcy within single circuits.
23

See Id.
See In re Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California ex rel., 350 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that section
1142’s “notwithstanding” clause expressly preempted a state law affecting the financial condition of the debtor); cf.
In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, 332 B.R. 262, 275 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (rejecting the notion that the legislative
history of section 365(a), and bankruptcy policy in general, requires finding express preemption of state law, but
finding preemption applicable on other grounds).
25
See Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. 713.
26
In re Miles, 294 B.R. 756, 759 (B.A.P 9th Cir. 2003).
27
See Ellman et al., BANKRUPTCY CODE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW, Nort. J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 3 Art. 2.
28
Id.
24
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For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted both
restrictive and expansive interpretations of field preemption at different times.29
3. Conflict Preemption

Conflict preemption is commonly applied in two scenarios: “(1) where ‘it is impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ and (2) where ‘state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.’”30 For example, in In re Congoleum Corp., 2008 WL 4186899 (Bankr. D.N.J.
2008), the Court dealt with an objection raised by the debtor’s insurers to its plan of
reorganization.31 The debtor’s plan proposed to transfer all of its asbestos insurance policies to a
section 524(g) trust to be formed from the plan of reorganization.32 The insurers objected on the
grounds that the debtor’s plan would violate the anti-assignment provisions of the policies, which
were otherwise enforceable under state law.33 The Court held that sections 524(g) and 1123 of
the Code preempted the anti-assignment provisions contained within these insurance policies.34
There, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New Jersey noted that the first
type of conflict preemption was not at issue in the case because it was possible for the debtor to
propose a plan that would not transfer any of the assets accruing from the insurance policies to a
trust.35 Therefore, the Court did not find the “simultaneous compliance impossible” version of

29

Compare Sherwood Partners, Inc., v. Lycos Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1205 (9th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that California
law giving a contract assignee avoidance powers different from those found in section 555 of the Code “trench[ed]
too close upon the exercise of federal bankruptcy power”) (limited approach to field preemption) with MSR
Exploration Ltd. v. Meridian Oil Inc., 74 F.3d 910, (9th Cir. 1996) (holding, state law was preempted where a
“slight incursion” by state law on “[the] activities [regulating] the rights of debtors and creditors” occurred)
(expansive approach to field preemption).

30

See supra, page 4.
See Id. at *1.
32
See Id.
31
33

See Id.
See Id. at *10
35
See Id. at *4
34
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conflict preemption to apply.36 However, the Court found the second version of conflict
preemption was applicable in this case because the anti-assignment provisions of the insurance
policies stood “as an obstacle to the full implementation of Congress’s goals.”37 Reasoning, that
section 524(g) was intended by Congress “to help companies deal with the flood of asbestos
lawsuits they were facing.”38 Also explaining, “if the anti-assignment provisions in insurance
contracts were not preempted by section 1123, then debtors would be prevented from
contributing what is often their most significant assets to the section 524(g) trust. Such a result is
clearly at odds with the expressed intent of Congress.”39 Therefore, because the court found a
direct conflict between the anti-assignment provisions of the insurance policies and the
legislative intent of sections 524(g) and 1123 of the Code, the enforceability of the antiassignment provisions under state law was preempted.
II.

In re Princeton
A. Background

In In re Princeton, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed Plymouth’s claim in
Princeton’s bankruptcy case pursuant to section 502(b)(1) for violating New Jersey’s tax sale
law.40 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected Plymouth’s argument on appeal
that claims allowance under the Code preempts New Jersey’s tax sale law. Therefore, because
Plymouth’s claim was disallowed under section 502(b)(1) of the Code, the lien Plymouth held
against Princeton’s property was forfeited pursuant to section 506(d).41
B. Relevant Law

36

See Id.
See Id. at *5.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See In re Princeton, 649 F. App’x 140 (3d Cir. 2016).
41
See Id. 11 U.S.C § 502(b)(1) and § 506(d) (2012).
37
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The ultimate issue in this case was whether the preemption doctrine required New
Jersey’s tax sale law to yield to the claims filing process of the Code. Under a preemption
analysis, the court’s understanding of the relationship between New Jersey’s tax sale law and the
Code is dispositive. Thus, the decision in this case turned on the court’s interpretation of the
interaction between the Code and New Jersey’s tax sale law, and the doctrine of preemption.
1. The Claims Filing Process of the Code

Chapter 5 of the Code governs the claims filing process.42 After a debtor declares
bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to collect the assets of the debtor and place them in a
bankruptcy estate.43 See, 11 U.S.C. § 701. Next, section 501 of the Code permits a creditor to
file their claims against the estate to establish their interest in the distribution of the estate’s
assets at the conclusion of the debtor’s case.44 In turn, section 502(a) states that a claim filed
under section 501 is allowed unless “a party in interest” (e.g., the debtor or the trustee) objects to
the creditor’s claim. When an objection is made, the bankruptcy court will provide “notice and
hearing” to determine the allowable amount of the claim.45 Thus, although an objected to claim
will generally be allowed under section 502, subsection (b) delineates nine exceptions to that
general rule.46 For example, subsection (b)(1) provides that a claim will not be allowed “to the
extent such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any
agreement or applicable law.”47 This exception authorizes a debtor to challenge a claim from
any objection accruing to them outside of the Code, in addition to objections provided by the
Code.
42

See 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq.
See 11 U.S.C. § 701.
44
See 11 U.S.C. § 501 (note, however, that the process of collection and distribution of a bankruptcy case
commenced under chapter 11 or 13 of the Code will differ from a chapter 7 proceeding).
45
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a).
46
See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012).
47
Id.
43
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Furthermore, claims are divided into two general categories: secured claims, and
unsecured claims. Section 506 of the Code governs the disposition of secured claims.48
Allowable claims under section 502 become allowable secured claims under section 506(a) “to
the extent of the value of such creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property.”49
However, pursuant to subsection (d), a lien securing a claim that was not allowed under section
502(b) is rendered “void.”50
2. New Jersey’s Tax Sale Law

Like other states, New Jersey allows third parties to purchase tax liens at auction.51
These liens against real property arise in the first instance from property owners falling behind
on their taxes.52 The municipality where the property is located is granted a lien on the property
by operation of the statute. The municipality will then conduct an auction, where the rights it
obtained are sold to this highest bidder.53

Successfully bidding on the lien at auction gives the

purchaser the right to foreclose on the property and to seek a judgment on the debt note.54 The
bidding begins at 18% interest, and each bid lowers the interest rate that would have been
assessed on the tax debt.55 Once the bidding reaches 0%, the parties will then begin to bid up on
a premium payable to the municipality.56 The party that wins at auction pays the municipality
the tax debt owed by the delinquent property owner and any premium incurred during the
bidding process in exchange for the tax sale certificate.57 However, New Jersey’s tax sale statute
also provides that any holder of a tax sale certificate who “knowingly charges or exacts an excess
48

See 11 U.S.C. § 506 et seq.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
50
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
51
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:5-1 et seq.
52
See Id.
53
See Id. 54:5–86(a).
54
See Id.
55
See Id. 54:5–32.
56
See Id.
57
See Id.
49
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fee in connection with the redemption of any tax sale certificate,” shall forfeit such tax sale
certificate to the person who was charged the excessive fee.58
C. Facts and Procedural History

Princeton LP, is a New Jersey limited partnership.59 Princeton’s principal asset is a
vacant office park located in the Township of Lawrence, New Jersey.60 Plymouth Park Tax
Services LLC is a limited liability company in the business of investing in tax sale certificates.61
After Princeton failed to pay its property taxes, the Township of Lawrence placed a tax lien on
their office park.62 On December 19, 2005 Plymouth purchased the tax sale certificate at an
auction conducted by the Township of Lawrence.63 The purchase price included the tax debt
owed by Princeton and a premium of $600,100; for a total of $804,496.79.64 On December 18,
2007, Plymouth filed a foreclosure action against Princeton, prompting Princeton to declare
bankruptcy.65 The case raised issues of both preemption and New Jersey state tax law.
After Princeton filed for bankruptcy, on December 29, 2008, Plymouth filed its proof of
claim with the Bankruptcy Court.66 See Id. Significantly, Plymouth included the premium it
paid to the Township of Lawrence in that claim.67 See Id. The amount of Plymouth’s claim was
$1,775,791.33.68 See Id. Princeton objected, on the grounds that it violated the New Jersey tax
sale law.69 See Id. At first, the bankruptcy court’s position was that Plymouth’s claim did not

58

See Id. 54:5–63.1.
See In re Princeton Office, 649 F. App’x 140.
60
See Id. at 138-39.
61
See Id.
62
See Id.
63
See Id.
64
See Id.
65
See Id.
66
See Id.
67
See Id.
68
See Id.
69
See Id.
59
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violate New Jersey’s tax sale law.70 However, Princeton moved the court to reconsider and a
bench trial was held.71 As a result of that trial, the bankruptcy court disallowed Plymouth’s
claim, concluding that Plymouth’s inclusion of the premium constituted a “knowing attempt to
charge an excessive fee in redeeming its tax sales certificate” in violation of New Jersey’s tax
sale law.72 Plymouth appealed that decision to the District Court of New Jersey, arguing that
New Jersey’s tax sale law was preempted by the Code’s claims allowance process.73 The
District Court rejected that argument and affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court.74
Subsequently, Plymouth appealed the decision of the District Court to the Court of Appeals,
renewing their preemption argument. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the District Court.75
D. Rationale

In Plymouth’s appeal to the District Court, Plymouth first addressed the operation of New
Jersey’s tax sale law within the Code, stating, “[the Bankruptcy Court’s] reach-down to a State
statute in the claims’ objection process ... is exactly the type of remedy preempted by the
Bankruptcy Code.”76 Next, Plymouth reasoned that the Code preempted New Jersey’s tax sale
law because “the Debtor’s initiation of bankruptcy proceedings ushered in the Bankruptcy Code
and rules promulgated thereunder which specify comprehensive and detailed procedures for the
filing and consideration of creditors’ claims and resolution of disputes over claims.”77 Further
adding, “[c]laims consideration and allowance are core functions of the bankruptcy system and

70

See In re Princeton Office Park, 2015 WL 420171 at *2 (D.N.J. 2015).
See Id.
72
See Id.
73
See Id.
74
See Id. at *5
75
See In re Princeton, 649 F. App’x 140.
76
See In re Princeton Office Park, 2015 WL 420171 at *4.
77
Id.
71
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preempt the application of N.J.S.A. 54:5–63.1 and its alternative and conflicting remedy
prescription.”78
The District Court rejected that reasoning holding, “there is no direct conflict between the
Bankruptcy Code’s claims objection procedure and the Tax Sale Law's forfeiture remedy.”79 Id.
at *5. In addition, the court explained, “complying with both the Bankruptcy Code and the Tax
Sale Law is not impossible. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or the Tax Sale Law required
Plymouth to include the premium in its first proof of claim.”80 Therefore, in evaluating
Plymouth’s preemption argument, the District Court simply looked to the plain language of the
Code.
At the Court of Appeals, the Third Circuit Court agreed with the District Court, stating,
“the District Court properly concluded that the U.S. Bankruptcy Code did not preempt § 54:5–
63.1 and looked to that provision to determine if Plymouth's claim was enforceable.”81 The court
explained, “[a]s part of the claims allowance process, the [Code] permits a creditor to file a claim
against a debtor, at which point the debtor can object to that claim by arguing that it is
unenforceable under applicable state law.”82 Hence, like the District Court, the Court of
Appeals looked to the plain language of the Code in rejecting Plymouth’s argument. However,
the Circuit Court also added, “courts often look to state law to determine the validity of a proof
of claim.”83 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded, “[a] claim against the bankruptcy estate ... will
not be allowed in a bankruptcy proceeding if the same claim would not be enforceable against
the debtor outside of bankruptcy.”84
78

Id.
Id.
80
See In re Princeton, 649 F. App’x 140.
79
81
82

Id.
See Id.
84
Id. (other citations omitted).
83
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III.

Remaining Questions from the Third Circuit’s Decision in In re Princeton for the
Application of Preemption in Bankruptcy

An important question remains after the decision in this case. Seemingly, both the
District Court and the Court of Appeals analyzed Plymouth’s argument under the framework of
the first version of conflict preemption by merely looking to the plain language of the Code.85
For example, the District Court’s inquiry into whether the New Jersey’s tax sale law presented a
“direct conflict” with the Code strongly suggests that the court was applying a conflict
preemption analysis.86 However, Plymouth’s argument was more akin to field preemption. In
fact, this discrepancy would explain why the courts never addressed Princeton’s objection to
Plymouth’s claim under New Jersey’s, i.e., that the tax sale law did not accrue until after the
initiation of Princeton’s bankruptcy case. Thus, this decision leaves open the question of
whether New Jersey’s tax sale law could be preempted under a theory of field preemption.
A. Alternative Interpretations of Plymouth’s Argument on Appeal

The language Plymouth employed in its argument on appeal substantially resembled a
field preemption argument.87 For example, Plymouth’s statements regarding the
“comprehensiveness” of the Code matches the Court’s reasoning in In re Miles.88 Moreover,
Plymouth’s argument regarding the “core functions” of the Code reflects the reasoning of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in MSR Exploration.89 There, the Court stated, “the complex, detailed,
and comprehensive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code ... demonstrates Congress’s intent to
create a whole system under federal control which is designed to bring together and adjust all of

85

See supra, page 8.
See In re Princeton Office Park, 2015 WL 420171 at *4.
87
See supra, page 13.
88
See In re Miles, 294 B.R. 759 (explaining, “Congressional intent to preempt may be inferred from a scheme of
federal regulation that is so comprehensive ... that the federal system may be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject”).
89
See supra, at page 7.
86
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the rights and duties of creditors and embarrassed debtors alike.”90 Like the Courts’ reasoning in
those cases, Plymouth similarly couched its argument in the pervasiveness of the Code’s
provisions. Thus, Plymouth’s argument was not referring to the compatibility of New Jersey’s
tax sale law and section 502(b)(1) of the Code, rather Plymouth was asking the Courts to infer
that Congress intended for claims allowance under the Code to displace state law in these
circumstances. By only looking to the plain language of the Code, the Courts in this case may
have failed to properly understand Plymouth’s preemption argument.
Conclusion
In rejecting Plymouth’s argument on appeal under the framework of conflict preemption,
the Court left open the possibility that claims allowance under the Code could be preempted
under a theory of field preemption. Given the unusual circumstances of this case, it remains to
be seen whether such a result would occur in a similar case. In sum, while the decision in In re
Princeton left the doctrine of preemption uncertain with respect to claims allowance in
bankruptcy, creditors in such cases would be wise to stay current with the state law creating their
claims, lest they go the way of Plymouth.

90

MSR Exploration, 74 F.3d 914 (emphasis added).
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